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Introduction 
Much of the literature concerned with the politics of rising tides is about the involvement of 
states and others in the processes of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and its annual Conference of the Parties (COP). Although non-state 
actors, including international non-government organizations (NGOs), are acknowledged as 
being part of these processes, it has often been claimed that the voices of local NGOs are 
absent from debates on vulnerability and resilience, as though there were no debates taking 
place elsewhere. This chapter addresses this absence by explicitly acknowledging that rising 
sea levels and the consequent changes to local lives are the focus of discussions beyond the 
UNFCCC. It shows how the politics of vulnerability is clear in messages around mitigation of 
climate change, where the audiences are foreign governments, institutions at a transnational 
level, and activists and interested citizens from around the world. It explores the politics of 
resilience in messages about adaptation to climate change, disseminated by and through local 
NGOs, sometimes in collaboration with international NGOs, where the key audience is the 
population of island states.  
The focus here is on small island developing states (SIDS) in the Pacific, the 
engagement of their local NGOs with issues of sea level rise and their involvement with other 
organizations and alliances, including the international NGOs, specifically the Pacific Calling 
Partnership (PCP) and the Climate Action Network (CAN). CAN is a worldwide organization 
that aims to promote government and individual actions on climate change, through 
information flow and the coordination of strategies on climate issues from local to 
international levels. It operates at the regional level through hubs such as the Pacific Island 
Climate Action Network (PICAN) and through coordinating local NGOs, through 
organizations such Kiribati Climate Action Network (KiriCAN) and Tuvalu Climate Action 
network (TuCAN). Pacific Calling Partnership is a program of the Edmund Rice Centre for 
Justice and Community Education, an Australian development organization using community 
education to change the world, beginning with awareness raising and leading to advocacy and 
social action. PCP’s focus is Pacific peoples affected by climate change, particularly in the 
populations of Kiribati and Tuvalu. 
To understand how the politics of rising tides plays out, this chapter uses the framing 
of narratives to show the key messages communicated by the multiplicity of voices in the 
debates and actions. An analysis of the narratives of Pacific Island states shows that differing 
groups express differing understandings of what rising tides mean, that these narratives have 
specific audiences, and that they tend to exist in defined contexts, such as COP meetings, or 
local settings (Fairclough 2003). Unlike the perception of the outcomes of UNFCCC COP, 
where consensus is the expected outcome, in the broader context of local engagement with 
rising tides at a local level, it is apparent that there can be no consensus narrative. The 
messages embedded in these narratives of vulnerability and resilience are diverse, each 
competing for the attention of its audience and evolving as new voices enter the debate and 
new technologies are used.  
 
Vulnerability and Resilience 
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Vulnerability and resilience are key terms in debates on sea level rise in SIDS. The work of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has become an authoritative source 
of definitions within the consensus decision-making approach of the UNFCCC (Adger 2006: 
273). Here, in 2001, vulnerability is seen as “the degree to which a system is susceptible to, 
or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and 
extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate change 
and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity and its adaptive capacity” (IPCC 
2001). This authoritative definition has been modified, with each reporting cycle showing 
slight variations, although always with a relationship between vulnerability and resilience. 
This is mediated through conceptions of adaptation and has more recently incorporated 
vulnerability resulting from loss and damage, which, it is recognized, cannot be mediated by 
adaptation, but requires an approach based on insurance.  
Otto et al. recently reviewed the extensive literature using the terminology of “social 
vulnerability”, in order to highlight that vulnerability is more than the consequence of 
susceptibility of a system, being “heavily shaped by social, demographic, and institutional 
factors such as gender, age, culture, education and ethnicity” (Otto et al. 2017: 1658). The 
narrative of the Suva Declaration (Pacific Island Development Forum (PIDF) 2015) is one 
that uses the concept of social vulnerability, an approach that shifts the focus of concern to a 
local level and to the human scale, and that introduces a sense of resilience. Here, although 
the populations of members of the PIDF may be victims of climate change, including sea 
level rise, they are not powerless (Denton 2017: 68). The declaration goes beyond the 
accepted narrative of disproportionate impact, an accepted assumption in understandings of 
vulnerability, to introduce human rights violations and inequality and discrimination into the 
debate. 
Sea level rise is linked to vulnerability in several ways. While there are still major 
uncertainties over the level of future sea level rises under various levels of global temperature 
increases, the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (2014b:11) shows that under the higher levels 
of temperature increase, sea level rise of almost one meter may occur by 2100. Many of the 
SIDS are low lying. For example, in Tuvalu the average height of the land above sea level is 
less than 2 meters, and the country is therefore extremely vulnerable to the impact of rising 
sea levels. Here vulnerability is related to inundation and loss of land. As Kiribati states in 
their Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to address climate change, 
prepared for COP21, “In the long term, the most serious concern is that sea-level rise will 
threaten the very existence of Kiribati and as a nation” (Republic of Kiribati 2015: 15). Sea 
level rise also brings with it the threat of erosion and the consequent loss of land, both 
through the regular actions of the tides and through cyclones and storm surges. Inundation of 
the land is also a feature of these weather events, giving a foretaste of the predicted longer 
term effects of sea level rise. A third aspect of sea level rise is salination of the soil and of 
water, affecting food production and even the habitability of some islands. All three aspects 
of sea level rise, – inundation, erosion and salination – can disrupt daily lives, impacting the 
societies and economies of these islands. 
Resilience can also be conceptualized in several ways. As noted above, it is often 
linked to the notion of adaptive capacity, assuming that the system will be able to manage the 
impacts and keep working in more or less the same way (Gallopín 2006). This has been the 
approach emerging from the IPCC, where “human systems” have “adaptive capacity”, “the 
ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes) to 
moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the 
consequences” (IPCC 2001). Cannon and Müller-Mahn express concern that the increasing 
linkage of resilience to vulnerability will make resilience part of the scientific debate, 
whereas in their view it is a concept from the social sciences and its concern for politics and 
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economics should not be subsumed into technical concerns (2010: 633). Janssen et al. (2006), 
however, argue on the basis of an extensive bibliometric study, influenced by the IPCC 
reports, that while vulnerability is linked with adaptive capacity in the literature, resilience is 
separate. 
Placing the concept of resilience firmly in the social sciences, Folke states that 
“Resilience is an approach, a way of thinking” (Folke 2006: 260). He argues that in any 
consideration of resilience, social capital is important, including trust and social networks as 
are “social memory”, including experience of dealing with change and knowledge systems, 
including a variety of types of knowledge (Folke 2006: 259- 262).  
 
Addressing an international audience 
The successful use of a particular narrative of vulnerability by SIDS is illustrated by the 
concept’s use over many decades within the global climate change policy process. The 
vulnerability of SIDS to rising sea levels was scientifically recognized early in the process 
with the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) producing a report in 1989 on 
“Assessing the Vulnerability to Sea Level Rise “(UNEP 1989). Vulnerability to sea-level rise 
was reflected in the first IPCC Report (IPCC 1990) and it has been acknowledged in a series 
of international agreements to address global warming, including the 1992 UNFCCC, the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol, the 2010 Cancun Agreements (formalizing the 2009 Copenhagen 
Accord) and most recently the 2015 Paris Agreement. However, it must be acknowledged 
that this recognition of vulnerability has not yet been matched by an effective worldwide 
agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions to a level necessary to curtail temperature rise to 
1.5ºC. 
The successes in gaining an audience for their narratives of vulnerability have not 
been achieved by Pacific Islands in isolation. They are involved in several alliances and 
coalitions intended to give them greater influence in the UNFCCC processes and elsewhere. 
These include established coalitions, such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 
which has given the small states a “voice in the political arena” (Jaschik 2014: 287), so that 
they “box way above their weight” (Betzold 2010: 142) in ensuring that their concerns are on 
UN Climate Conference agendas, and the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), whose very 
name proclaims the way its members should be regarded. The formation of the CVF, led by 
Maldives, in 2009 and its Male’ Declaration made it possible for new voices to enter the 
international debates and be heard at COP15 in Copenhagen, where delegates, delivered a 
message charging members of the developed world with having caused the problem of global 
warming and calling on them to take responsibility and adopt active steps to fix the problem. 
Before COP15, Tuvalu was virtually unknown on the world stage, even within global climate 
change politics, but the term Tuvalu entered the narrative of vulnerability, being mentioned in 
542 stories related to climate change in December 2009, with 173 of these containing either 
“vulnerable” or “vulnerability” (according to a search on the global news database, Factiva). 
In the same time period, posts in CAN International’s email list-serve, CAN-talk, mentioned 
Tuvalu 532 times. At the same COP, Kiribati also rose to prominence, through what Webber 
(2013: 2728) refers to as an event that was “‘scripted’ and ‘rehearsed’ – ‘performances of 
vulnerability’” with dances and traditional costumes. 
Narratives of vulnerability must be continually performed for these small-island states 
to maintain the attention of their audiences. In the context of the UNFCCC, they use their 
INDCs, which are statements from the government of a state, prepared in consultation with 
civil society, including NGOs. These statements have two audiences, the international 
audience within the UNFCCC and the local audience through national policy development 
and implementation. INDCs prepared for COP21 in Paris perpetuate a narrative that describes 
these islands as low-lying, isolated and vulnerable, at risk from sea level rise which is a 
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catastrophe not of their making and for which they are in no way responsible as their 
contribution to global warming is insignificant, their “emissions per capita being amongst the 
lowest in the world” (Republic of Kiribati, 2015). They further reinforce the narrative of 
vulnerability, through references to the small populations of these states, and their reliance on 
external funding to support strategies of adaptation.  
The messages inherent in the INDCs and in the statements about the SIDS’ plans for 
the future are, however, more complex than this. They go beyond the technical aspects of 
erosion and inundation, and in different ways, introduce the consequences of sea level rise. 
Kiribati refers to “its highly vulnerable socio-economic and geographical situation” 
(Republic of Kiribati, 2015:15), noting that the state “has a right to develop its economy and 
improve the well-being of its population” and indicating its need for financial aid. The 
Republic of the Marshall Islands sees its people being among the most vulnerable in the 
world to the impacts of climate change, which “inflict damage and impose substantial costs” 
and which threaten the livelihoods of communities, undermine food and water security and 
put health at risk. Similarly, it “recognizes that it has a role to play in the global effort to 
combat climate change”, even though its greenhouse gas emissions are “negligible on a 
global scale” (Republic of the Marshall Islands 2015 INDC). Tuvalu states that sea level rise 
exacerbates existing cultural and socio-economic vulnerabilities which could “threaten the 
security of the nation” (Government of Tuvalu 2015 INDC).  
The complexity of these narratives can be seen in the recent proliferation of 
coalitions, each with its own focus. Members of the Coalition of Low Lying Atoll Nations on 
Climate Change (CANCC) formed in 2014, which includes the nations of Kiribati, Maldives, 
Marshall Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu, state that they bring “a whole new meaning to human 
rights and the right to a secure future” (CANCC 2014). Their priority is the resourcing of 
measures to protect the physical environment and to enhance the capacity of their populations 
through programs of education and awareness-raising (CANCC 2014). The High Ambition 
Coalition, created at COP21 in Paris in 2015, has been spearheaded by the Marshall Islands, a 
very small nation but one which is seen to have “moral authority and thought leadership” 
(Woodroofe 2016). The rhetoric of ambitious action here is embedded in the group’s title and 
they have agreed to tackle some of the more intractable problems, such as taking the issue of 
shipping emissions to the International Maritime Organization, a significant step for countries 
like the Marshall Islands, which benefit from a flag of convenience shipping registry.  
The V20 group, comprising the Finance Ministers of twenty members of the Climate 
Vulnerable Forum (including Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Republic of Marshall Islands), was 
established in Lima, Peru, in 2015 at a meeting in conjunction with the 2015 Annual 
Meetings of the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund. It similarly frames its 
narratives in terms of ambitious action in the face of dangers including the health and 
economic impacts of climate change, seen to encompass human rights issues, as it seeks 
financial support for economic development and to cover loss and damage from severe 
weather events. This group took its message to the G20 meeting in April 2017, echoing the 
narrative of ambitious action expected from G20 members and reinforcing the difference in 
size and strength through the phrase “David meets Goliath” (Hansen 2017).  
In spite of similarities in the narratives presented to international audiences, it would 
be a mistake to assume that these Pacific Islands have identical narratives. The leaders of 
Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands have presented conflicting narratives about their 
long term futures, with Anote Tong, former President of Kiribati “plan[ning] for the worst 
and hop[ing] for the best” (Weiss in Barnett 2017: 8), whereas the former Foreign Minister of 
the Marshall Islands, Tony de Brum said “We will operate on the basis that we can in fact 
help to prevent this from happening” (Mathieson in Barnett 2017: 9). The Prime Minister of 
Tuvalu, Enele Sopoaga, stated that “We do not want to move … Our lives and culture are 
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based on our continued existence on the islands of Tuvalu. We will survive” (Sopoaga in 
Barnett, 2017:9). 
 
Networking and NGOs 
Networks such as Climate Action Network and NGOs such as Pacific Calling Partnership 
have complex relationships with the governments of islands in the Pacific and with NGOs in 
these countries. They are involved in the narratives with international audiences and 
narratives with local audiences. KiriCAN and TuCAN are members of CAN and its regional 
node, Pacific Islands Climate Action Network (PICAN). Both CAN and PCP are enthusiastic 
users of online sources, especially Facebook, supporting the claim that NGOs concerned with 
climate change and with the environment are “champions of online climate communication” 
(Schäfer, 2012: 530 - 531). They use technologies to create their networks, thereby 
disseminating information, including to the media, increasing support for climate change 
action and even mobilizing local citizens to take action. It is in this context that the narratives 
they use are considered here.  
The Facebook page for PICAN, which provides information and links to resources, 
demonstrates that the narratives evident through the posts made in 2016-2017, are 
institutional, representing the UNFCCC agenda and promoting awareness-raising and 
training to participate in debates at this level, with an emphasis on preparation for 
involvement in COP23. This is understandable as Fiji, a key country for PICAN, holds the 
presidency for COP23. Unsurprisingly, given the strategy statement of PICAN which 
includes an emphasis on fundraising, the Green Climate Fund and its application process is 
also given prominence and Tuvalu is applauded for its success in receiving money through 
this fund. The narrative also demonstrates the significant engagement of women in the 
discussions and actions involving women, with the emphasis on capacity building through 
women. 
The PCP has a much higher profile online than PICAN, with more frequent postings 
and evidence of face-to-face work with local activists. The Kiribati-Tuvalu-Australia 
Exchange Program (KATEP) is a key focus of the work of PCP. It is a training program held 
in Australia and the Pacific that develops the climate change advocacy skills of emerging 
young leaders from Kiribati and Tuvalu through workshops and practical experience in 
Australia. It is an example of how PCP works in solidarity with the people of Kiribati and 
Tuvalu to build capacity to advocate for action on climate change and to raise awareness in 
Australia of how climate change is affecting Pacific Islands. Its webpage emphasizes its 
collaborative role in supporting communities in the Pacific to make their voices heard in 
climate change discussions. Its Facebook page shows this support in action, with photos and 
reports from Kiribati and Tuvalu from activists closely linked to PCP and its work, as well as 
from others undertaking capacity-building actions in the islands. The PCP’s Facebook page 
often contains links to opinion pieces by prominent people, especially islanders. The 
narrative does not ignore institutional links, but includes those relevant to the people of 
Kiribati and Tuvalu, such as the United Nations pages for International Day for the 
Conservation of the Mangrove Ecosystem, and select scientific and other reports.  
 
Involving the local population 
There is no single narrative at a local level. The politics of rising tides at the local level 
ensures that government processes, NGOs, churches, local communities, traditional leaders, 
women, youth and so on each have their own narrative which can exist independently of 
other local narratives. Cultures around belief systems and authority affect involvement in 
decision-making processes and in implementation of local decisions and national polices, 
reinforcing the existence of these separate narratives. Local knowledge is important in 
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understanding engagement with issues of sea level rise. For example, Christian churches in 
the Pacific Islands are highly influential, with more than 95% of the population being 
members, according to recent censuses in Tuvalu and Kiribati. Some Pacific Islanders do not 
believe in the narrative of rising tides because of their understanding of God’s promise to 
Noah, documented in the Book of Genesis, that God would never again flood the Earth 
(Paton and Fairbairn 2010; Donner 2011). Countering this narrative, the Reverend Tafue 
Lusama, General Secretary of the Congregational Christian Church of Tuvalu (Ekalesia 
Kelisiano Tuvalu – EKT), and Chair of TuCAN, said in the context of Cyclone Pam: 
“Climate change represents a spiritual as well as a physical crisis for our people. We 
desperately need to educate communities about the fact that God has not abandoned us; 
climate change is caused by humans and requires a human response” (Uniting Church of 
Australia 2015).  
Another important influence on attitudes to rising sea levels and consequent actions is 
the politics of local decision-making which may mean that women and younger men (under 
the age of 50) are excluded from active participation in local decision-making (Paton and 
Fairbairn-Dunlop 2010). Island Councils may be subordinated to higher-level authorities 
(Nunn et al. 2014), regardless of the legal status of this council of elders (Richardson 2009). 
This assertion cannot be generalized across the island states, nor even within a given state as 
the customs surrounding traditional leaders and their power differ from state to state, and also 
may vary from island to island within a country (Nunn et al. 2014). 
The traditional knowledge which has sustained life on the islands since time 
immemorial has recently been acknowledged as an integral part of the process of adapting to 
climate change (IPCC 2014a: 26). In Tuvalu, for example, traditional forecasting techniques 
for anticipating extreme weather events are still relied on, and traditional knowledge has been 
adapted to match contemporary conditions, – for example, when women from the Nanumea 
community on Funafuti bury germinating nuts and taro in plastic drums to keep them safe 
from rising saltwater (Nakashima, 2012: 93-95). Yet Maria Tiimon, Pacific Outreach Officer 
at the Edmund Rice Centre in Sydney and a native of Kiribati, noted that an important aspect 
of specialist traditional knowledge in Kiribati is that it is not part of a narrative for the 
community but remains secret, in the custody of the family who have over generations, 
developed this specialist expertise (Teaero 2003). Such knowledge is lost if there is no one to 
pass it on to (personal communication 25 May 2017). 
The voices of scientists are rarely heard in local narratives. This may be because the 
islands lack the education systems and sound knowledge-sharing infrastructure necessary to 
engage in climate change discussions in a nuanced way (Abeysinghe and Huq 2016: 198). An 
exception may be seen in a book by i-Kiribati man, Riibeta Abeta, hailed as the “first i-
Kiribati international publication on climate change by a single author” and resulting from 
research undertaken for a Masters’ degree (Office of the President, Republic of Kiribati 
2014). Given his involvement at the time in the Ministry of Environment, Lands and 
Agricultural Development, it is clear that the work contributed to local debates.  
NGOs may also engage in so-called citizen science, a useful tool for collecting data 
and for awareness raising (Johnson et al. 2014). In Tuvalu, the NGO Alofa Tuvalu has used 
islanders to collect scientific data, both for local projects and for international projects. 
Further, Kelman (2010: 607-609) points out that peer-reviewed scientific journals do draw on 
SIDS perspectives and that SIDS scientists have played a crucial role in establishing and 
contributing to organizations such as the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). 
People employed in government roles are involved in regional projects funded through 
organizations such as the Asian Development Bank, and contribute their knowledge and 
expertise to a wider audience through the reports of these projects. However, there are 
obstacles to sharing scientific knowledge. The Asia Pacific Adaptation Network notes the 
 7 
impact of “differences in language, perceptions and interests” with constraints on capacity 
and knowledge which are compounded by the difference in scale of member countries, 
ranging from Bangladesh and Indonesia to tiny Tuvalu (APAN 2017). Occasionally, 
competing narratives of the government itself and its bureaucracy may arise as a barrier. An 
anonymous informant to this study noted “the work that I have published has not been 
utilized much. As the projects are mostly planned and executed by top down centrally 
controlled institutions, the expertise outside the government institutions [is] seldom utilized”. 
NGOs are important in the development of local narratives. Both Kiribati and Tuvalu 
have an active NGO network engaged in climate change actions. KiriCAN and TuCAN have 
the challenging tasks of both being the voice of NGOs in external fora and coordinating 
actions within these island states. Although the narratives of the NGOs may be different from 
those of the government, it would be naïve to claim that they are not significantly influenced 
by the wider context of the scientific community and UNFCCC debates (cf Rudiak-Gould 
2011). Although projects may be part of a state’s plan for adaptation, and they may be funded 
as such by an external donor, the narrative is likely to be distinct from that of the government 
and the INDC. The narratives of local NGOs can be seen as narratives of resilience, tending 
to focus on improving the conditions for communities.  
Food security has been a significant narrative across the islands of the Pacific. In 
2014, the Tuvalu Council of Women ran workshops on home gardening and in 2015, it ran a 
competition on food security based on the knowledge and skills acquired in this workshop. 
They have also been involved in other projects to help villagers develop skills and expertise 
in growing staple foods such as pulaka (swamp yams) in pots which help to protect them 
from salination and the effects of inundation from storm surge. In Tokelau, a non-self-
governing territory of New Zealand, as in other parts of the Pacific, the development of 
keyhole gardens is being funded as a strategy to improve food security. This project, 
supported by the Fatupaepae (traditional local council of women) in the three villages of 
Tokelau, also engages youth.  
Fresh water and sanitation constitute another narrative found in the work of NGOs. In 
Kiribati, a number of years ago, the Kiribati Women’s Centre (Aia Maea Ainen Kiribati – 
AMAK), the peak body for women’s organizations, was involved in a waste management 
project, the longer term aim of which was to improve health outcomes and to return 
cultivable land to production. AMAK and other NGOs have been engaged in the planting of 
mangroves as part of a soft-barrier plan to prevent erosion by the sea. The Tobwaraoi 
Community Nanikaai (2017) established a committee to clean up the beach, which was being 
used as a public toilet as well as a dump for rubbish, and to install a water tank. In Abaiang, 
KiLGA, the Kiribati Local Government Association (2016), an affiliate of KiriCAN, was 
involved in the installation of rainwater harvesting tanks, to help to solve the problems with 
access to clean drinking water, caused by the rising sea level as well as by pressure of 
population. 
 
Globalizing and localizing ethical practices 
The politics of rising tides emerges from narratives described earlier. These narratives, which 
have changed over time, show messages aimed at a variety of audiences. The proliferation of 
coalitions involving small island states, especially in the lead-up to COP21 in Paris, shows 
the complexity of the issue of rising tides and the importance of having access to a range of 
key audiences, who have power in different aspects of global governance. At the international 
level, the small island states have to acknowledge that their success in gaining acceptance of 
the statement at COP21 in Paris to hold global temperature rise to well below 2ºC above pre-
industrial levels has not led to policies sufficient to prevent some currently inhabited atolls of 
Kiribati or Tuvalu disappearing in the next fifty years. This is leading to the emergence of 
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other narratives. The emphasis on isolation, distance from centers of power, which for so 
long set these islands aside and helped to create their vulnerability, is being replaced by the 
idea that they are the forerunners, on the frontline of a catastrophe which will affect everyone 
in due course (CANCC 2014). This is the global scale that the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands (2015) refers to in its INDC. Implicit in this narrative is the reminder that the threats 
faced by the populations of these islands will sooner or later affect the citizens of some of the 
heavy emitters.  
This narrative is closely linked to the use of the global citizen narrative – that 
everyone has a responsibility towards the other and to the agreed processes that make a 
common or shared life possible. This narrative brings with it ideas of global effort in 
minimizing greenhouse gas emissions. It is this narrative that is in play for the High 
Ambition Coalition, whose message is clearly that many emitting countries are not ambitious 
enough in their targets, and that they are not putting in enough effort. What that effort might 
be and how ambition might be measured is a moot point. Some members of the High 
Ambition Coalition have been charged with hypocrisy because of their continued high level 
of reliance on fossil fuels, for example, as they transition to other forms of energy. Yet the 
point remains that small-island nations such as the Marshall Islands, through the High 
Ambition Coalition for Shipping, are taking steps towards actions that others have so far 
found too difficult (Climate Policy Observer 2017). 
This sense of high ambition is matched with the notion of moral leadership, which 
was introduced by the CVF in its Male’ Declaration at the same time as other terms in the 
narrative of vulnerability. Moral leadership does not seem to have been adopted as widely as 
other terms in the debates on rising tides, although Kiribati refers to its own moral imperative 
to contribute to limiting global temperature rise in its INDC 2015. 
This proliferation of messages at the level of international institutions now approaches 
the multiplicity of narratives at the local level, but the strength of these narrative intended for 
international audiences could prevent local narratives of resilience and resourcefulness from 
being heard (Farbotko (2005: 289). The question that might be asked about local narratives 
not being heard is whether they are narratives aimed at outsiders; if local narratives aimed at 
outsiders are not being heard, that would indeed be a cause for concern.  
The concern here, then, is with the distinctions in content, purpose and audience for 
narratives emerging from local populations and in particular from NGOs and intended for 
local audiences. Civil society arising through formal organizations is potentially at odds with 
traditional structures of decision-making and implementation in Pacific Island cultures. 
Claims that women’s voices are missing from local debates are not entirely borne out by the 
evidence that women’s NGOs in the states considered here are influential in leading a range 
of adaptation strategies. However, it may be the case that women have been successful in 
using the channels of action available to them, not the channels of traditional leadership, but 
those opened through links to the international community, the channels of NGOs. In the 
urbanized areas of these island nations, many overseas NGOs have staff working or even 
offices which provide a support structure for women to be involved in debates and to take 
action, giving women access to power and status of a kind not available to them through 
traditional structures. 
Involvement with NGOs based overseas, such as PCP, influences local narratives in 
two ways. First, they bring the consensus narratives of climate science to the islands and train 
people in how to use them in local contexts; second, and importantly, they train young 
leaders to take messages based on their experiences to others in their community and into 
wider discussions. As Jill Finnane, the PCP coordinator, recently said: “We should never lose 
sight of the fact that this is about more than just science. It's about people, their cultures and 
their right to a just and secure future” (SciDev.Net 2017). 
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This emphasis on daily life and the efforts involved in maintaining it are key elements 
in the local narrative. However, these efforts are not ones concerned, at one level, with 
preventing or minimizing rising tides; they are mainly concerned with ensuring a supply of 
safe drinking water or a staple food crop. In Tuvalu, in particular, they are concerned with 
recognition of the importance of traditional local knowledge and the use of social memory, a 
strong indication of a narrative of resilience (Folke 2006). Local knowledge is not only 
knowledge about the environment and about the skills in living between the land and the sea, 
it is also knowledge of the social and political processes through which decisions can be 
made and implemented (Lebel 2013: 1071). 
The young leaders in the PCP KATEP program bring their own experiences to the 
narrative of rising tides, ensuring that although key aspects of innovation and adaptability in 
daily life and an emphasis on the importance of traditional culture are part of this narrative, it 
is not a narrative that becomes ritualized. It is constantly renewed by these new voices, ones 
which have had the opportunity for experiences outside of the very local context. The 
KATEP program gives the opportunity for local experiences and practices to be shared, so 
that innovations in one island can be considered for adoption in another island. It is a 
program dependent on the creation of personal and social relationships – social capital (cf 
Folke 2006) – which can be added to the network of relationships already existing within 
families, islands and states.  
This emphasis on sharing experiences is seen to build on local approaches to learning 
and building new knowledge. It is also a way to overcome the narratives of isolation and 
distance. Distance and isolation, caused in part by “intermittent and irregular boat trips” 
(Paton and Fairbairn 2010: 689), have often meant that the inhabitants on individual islands 
must be able to meet their own basic needs. This reliance on self may have meant that people 
are unaware of the policies and plans of the government, located in some far-off atoll (Nunn 
et al. 2014), reinforcing the particularity of the very local narrative. The online presence of 
NGOs such as PCP and CAN help to overcome this sense of separation, even though the 
Internet is accessible to between 14.6% of the population (Kiribati), 37.6% (Marshall Islands) 
and 50.1% (Tuvalu) as at March 2017 (Internet World Stats 2017).  
Social media and the Internet have the capacity to overcome perceptions of distance 
and isolation and to bring much greater immediacy to interactions, and through this 
facilitating the access of the very local and very personal into institutionalized discussions, as 
Mattlan Zackhras, a former government minister from the Marshall Islands, has argued. At a 
preparatory meeting for COP22 in Marrakech, he used Twitter to let his fellow attendees 
know about the situation at home: “This is personal. Hard being at Pre-COP as king tides hit 
my island home. Powerful reminder of why we all need to do more. Fighting for all those 
affected” and accompanied the tweet with photos showing the flooding (Koekoek 2016). This 
use of the local in the context of institutional meetings may signal the beginning of a new 
narrative for international audiences. This new narrative is developing in parallel with the 
conventional narratives, reinforcing the human rights narratives of food security and access to 
clean water, and demonstrating the ways that local populations use traditional knowledge, 




There are two particularly important narratives that are widely used by both by the 
governments of these small-island developing states and NGOs in relation to the politics of 
rising tides. At a superficial level, it can be asserted that the first relates to the SIDS’ 
vulnerability. The focus for this is primarily international audiences. The second narrative 
relates to resilience where the focus is primarily on local NGOs and citizens. That said, this 
 10 
overlooks the complex ways in which the narratives for international audiences have evolved 
since 2009, from ones which brought a spotlight to the notion of victim, through a series of 
moves which gives these victims the opportunity to point out that they are just part of an 
early warning system for the rest of the world, and to claim the moral high ground as they 
call for global effort and greater ambition. It also overlooks the forces at play in the narratives 
for local audiences, which focus on everyday life issues and where conflict may arise 
between beliefs based on religion and the secular, traditional leadership and modern 
legislated processes of government, between traditional community and civil society 
enshrined in NGOs, the roles of men and women, and traditional knowledge and scientific 
knowledge. 
The claims of high ambition and moral leadership may signal a significant shift in the 
politics of rising sea levels. Understanding local issues and problems as human rights issues 
will inevitably broaden both audiences and those developing narratives, especially through 
the immediacy of social media. These changes highlight the importance of maintaining a 
social justice perspective on sea level rise. 
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